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Office of the Director of National Intelligence Washington, DC 20511

January 10, 2006

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Ambassador Negroponte

FROM:

David R. Shedd Chief of Staff

SUBJECT:

Fallout from James Risen's State of War:

An Overview of Operational Compromises for Iran

Counterproliferation Efforts

(The state of the conjunction with CIA, I have carefully reviewed Chapter Nine of James Risen's book, State of War, which addresses counterproliferation efforts against Iran. The consensus is that Risen discloses a number of sensitive programs that could have serious consequences for Iranian counterproliferation operations. Specifically, Risen's disclosures—some of which are inaccurate—could affect Operation MERLIN (the provision of flawed nuclear weapons designs to Iran);

1. (The provided the Iranians of Chapter Nine the operation has been largely disclosed, albeit with significant inaccuracies. The chapter outlines the exact technical history of the fire set plans, including their drafting by one Russian "defector," the plans' corruption by the National Laboratory so that they would never work properly and would lead the target recipients down the wrong technical path, and the plans' delivery by a CIA source to the Iranian IAEA mission in Vienna in early 2000. Thus the targets will know in detail that the plans were a CIA operation designed to slow their nuclear weapons progress.

(TSI) Contrary to the book's claims, the CIA asset never detected the actual flaws inserted in the plans by the Lab, and even after he was told that the non-inclusion of the nuclear component #1 was intentional, he expressed no qualms about his role in the project. The book also asserts falsely that the targets could learn useful detail from the plans; the plans were "red-tearned" and certified by the Lab leadership to provide no new useful information to the Iranians

(DS.) In addition to disclosing important facts to Iran, the book will advise the Russians not only that we have details of some of their most sensitive nuclear weapons components, but that at least two former Russian nuclear weapons experts are in the U.S. and are cooperating with CIA. Moreover, there is enough detail about both former Russian experts to allow Russian counterintelligence officials to identify them.





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any beneficial effect of Classifled Program No. 1

will likely be negated by the book's publication.

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